The income of the rich consists of:

1. wages
2. rent from exclusive access to natural opportunities
3. the ordinary return on invested capital
4. profit from monopoly produced by effort (patents, natural Internet monopolies, etc.)

Existing theories say:

1. The optimal tax wages trades off the social value of government funds against the elasticity of the supply of labor.
2. The optimal tax on exclusive access to natural opportunities is 100% of the rental value of those opportunities, plus adjustments for externalities and depletion.
3. The optimal tax on the ordinary return to investments is zero tax, if initial endowments are appropriate.

That leaves taxation of the profit from elements of monopoly.

When monopolies are inefficient privileges, the best policy is to abolish them. When monopolies are arguably efficient, the best policy is to auction them to the highest bidders.

When monopolies result from effort in discovering productive opportunities, the optimal taxation problem has the same form as the optimal taxation of wages. Taxation yields socially valuable revenue but reduces effort. The optimal tax balances the trade-off efficiently.

A convenient way to approximate optimal taxation of items 2, 3, and 4 is to have a tax on wealth minus the depreciated value of capital investments, and to have scheduled depreciation of the sources of monopoly profits that trades off the social value of government revenue against the predicted reduction in entrepreneurial effort.